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HUMAN RIGHTS, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, AND THE
STORIES WE TELL
Natsu Taylor Saito*
In a fractured age, when cynicism is god, here is a possible heresy:
we live by stories, we also live in them. One way or another we are
living the stories planted in us early or along the way, or we are also
living the stories we planted-knowingly or unknowingly-in
ourselves. We live stories that either give our lives meaning or
negate it with meaninglessness. If we change the stories we live by,
quite possibly we change our lives.
_Ben Okri, A Way of Being Free1
In many respects, the story of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
2(UDHR), since its promulgation by the United Nations, is one of remarkable
growth of international recognition of the rights of all peoples. Nonetheless,
the framework of universal human rights continues to be contested, and one
need only glance at any newspaper to be reminded of the grim realities that
still confront much of the world's population. The 60th anniversary of the
UDHR gives us an opportunity to focus not only on the extent to which the
rights it articulates have gained acceptance in international discourse, but to
consider the options for extending and enforcing those rights. The theme of
this symposium is "Advancing the Consensus." The notion of a consensus
implies a common agreement, a shared narrative or story. The history of the
post-World War II human rights movement can be told as one of ever-
expanding agreement on certain basic or universally acknowledged values and
* © 2008 Natsu Taylor Saito, Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. A version of
this Essay was first presented at "Advancing the Consensus: 60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," a symposium held at Emory Law School. I am grateful to the organizers of that symposium, to the
editors of the Emory International Law Review, and to the Georgia State University College of Law for its
research support. Many of the ideas presented in abbreviated form here are discussed at greater length in my
forthcoming book, Meeting the Enemy: American Exceptionalism and International Law (forthcoming 2010).
1 BEN OKRI, A WAY OF BEING FREE 46 (1997).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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norms, embodied most visibly in the UDHR.3  However, it is also a story of
great frustration, as we consider the many impediments to the implementation
of these norms and are forced to acknowledge that life is exceedingly difficult
for most of the world's people.4 The premise that we have a consensus to be
advanced highlights what are often perceived as two major obstacles to the
human rights movements of the twenty-first century. One of these is American
exceptionalism, the United States' practice of unilaterally exempting itself
from participation in international organizations and human rights treaties
while simultaneously insisting that the rest of the world comply with
international norms. 5 Another is resistance in significant sectors of the world
to the universalization of rights on the grounds that international institutions
are being used to impose Western values unilaterally upon non-Western
cultures. 6  From the perspective of those struggling to "advance the
consensus," both of these tendencies seem to undermine the progress made
since 1948 in the field of international human rights. While often viewed as
representing diametrically opposed sources of pressure on the human rights
paradigm, they both may be products of the Eurocentric nature of
contemporary international law. If this is true, it may be time to consider
expanding and refraining the paradigm of human rights.
This Essay is a reflection on the narrative of American exceptionalism,
focusing on its premise that the United States represents the highest stage in
3 See Jochen von Bemstorff, The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 19 EuR. J. INT'L L. 903, 903
(2008).
4 For example, in 2008, the World Bank determined that 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty,
defined as an income of less than $1.25 per day. Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World is
Poorer than We Thought, but No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty 19 (World Bank Dev. Group,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4703, 2008). In addition, the United Nations Development Programme's
2007/2008 report noted that over 80% of the world's population live in countries where the income gap is
widening. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008, FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 25 (2007), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 20072008 EN Complete.pdf.
5 Many legal scholars have addressed the notion of American exceptionalism and have employed
definitions both more and less inclusive than the one employed herein. For other approaches, see generally
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign
Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1335 (2006); Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the
Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 393 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1479 (2003); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International
Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775 (2001).
6 See Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International
Law?, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 379, 389-91 (2007).
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the evolution of Western civilization achieved to date and its related claim to
be at the forefront of human progress. It is significant to the human rights
discourse because, while used as a justification for the United States' self-
exemption from the human rights regime, this foundational belief
simultaneously reinforces the Western ideals and values underlying the
contemporary international legal framework.7 In turn, the arguments used by
U.S. leaders to undergird their exceptionalist positions lend credence to critics
of contemporary human rights law who argue that human rights are being used
as a "Trojan horse" to impose a Western worldview on non-Western societies.8
My thesis is that if we are to achieve a true consensus about contemporary
human rights norms, we will have to take seriously the critique of their
colonial roots, opening up the discourse to the stories of all peoples. Only
then, I believe, will we be able to achieve an honest consensus capable of both
effectively countering American exceptionalism and providing a means of
embracing multiple understandings of the world within the framework of
international human rights. This is, of course, a large subject and what follows
are simply some preliminary thoughts to initiate the discussion.
I. THE COLONIAL PRESUMPTIONS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
In September 2008, law professor Steven Calabresi, a co-founder of the
neoconservative Federalist Society, provided an apt summary of the
exceptionalist perspective when he objected to the U.S. Supreme Court's
consideration of "foreign law" by arguing:
Those of us concerned about citation of foreign law . .. believe in
something called American exceptionalism, which holds that the
United States is a beacon of liberty, democracy and equality of
opportunity to the rest of the world .... The country that saved
Europe from tyranny and destruction in the 20th century and that is
now saving it again from the threat of terrorist extremism and
Russian tyranny needs no lessons from the socialist constitutional
courts of Europe on what liberty consists of.
9
7 Calabresi, supra note 5, at 1337-38; Koh, supra note 5, at 1482-83.
8 See GUSTAVO ESTEVA & MADHU SURI PRAKASH, GRASSROOTS POST-MODERNISM: REMAKING THE
SOIL OF CULTURES 117 (1998). For an excellent overview of the colonial premises of international law, see
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 2005).
9 Steven G. Calabresi, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A18; see Adam Liptak, U.S.
Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
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A similar sentiment was expressed by President George W. Bush in his
introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy, in which he described the
United States as representing the "single sustainable model for national
success" that had emerged in the twentieth century, and presented the United
States' plan to maintain and expand its "unparalleled military strength and
great economic and political influence," using it "to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the
world." 10
This perspective is not limited to those who advocate unilateralism in U.S.
foreign policy. In his speech acknowledging victory in the presidential
election of 2008, Barack Obama first noted that "a new dawn of American
leadership is at hand," and then proclaimed:
[T]o all those who have wondered if America's beacon still burns as
bright-tonight we proved once more that the true strength of our
nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our
wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy,
liberty, opportunity, and unyielding hope.
11
In this statement, President-elect Obama was invoking one of the most
common images of American exceptionalism: the United States as the
embodiment of freedom and democracy and, therefore, the light of hope for the
rest of the planet. He also was echoing a theme first articulated in 1630 by
Puritan minister John Winthrop, who predicted, "[W]ee shall be as a Citty
upon a Hill, 12 a theme reiterated by President Ronald Reagan when he stated
in his farewell address, "And how stands the city on this winter
night? . . . [S]he's still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have
freedom .... 
13
10 George W. Bush, Introduction to THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Sept. 2002); see also RICHARD A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA'S IMPERIAL
GEOPOLITICS 189-99 (2004).
11 Barack H. Obama, President-elect, Election Night Acceptance Speech (Nov. 4, 2008) (transcript
available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/ynews-pl135).
12 John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity, in AMERICAN SERMONS 28, 42 (1999).
13 Calabresi, supra note 5, at 1336 (quoting President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1718, 1722 (Jan. 11, 1989)). Alaska Governor and Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah
Palin also alluded to this vision in the vice presidential debate of October 2008:
[E]ven more important is that world view that I share with John McCain. That world view that
says that America is a nation of exceptionalism. And we are to be that shining city on a hill, as
President Reagan so beautifully said, that we are a beacon of hope and that we are unapologetic
here. We are not perfect as a nation. But together, we represent a perfect ideal. And that is
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This framing is significant because it reflects a core aspect of American
identity-the deeply ingrained belief that the United States represents the
highest stage of progressive development in the history of humanity. 14  As
anthropologist Eric Wolf notes:
Many of us ... grew up believing that [the] West has a genealogy,
according to which ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat
Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the
Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political
democracy and the industrial revolution. Industry, crossed with
democracy, in turn yielded the United States, embodying the rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
15
This view of history incorporates some of the most fundamental presumptions
of Western civilization-that there is a fundamental dichotomy between people
and nature; 16 that the benchmark of human civilization is the domination of
nature, particularly through science and technology; 17 that all of human history
can be understood in terms of a universal, linear path of progress toward
increased civilization; 18 and that what has been termed Western civilization
represents the highest stage of evolution in human history to date. 19 It is also a
view that focuses on difference and the "ranking" that can be assigned to
democracy and tolerance and freedom and equal rights. Those things that we stand for that can
be put to good use as a force for good in this world.
Sarah Palin, Governor, Alaska, The Biden-Palin Vice Presidential Debate at Washington University in St.
Louis (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2008b.html.
14 See ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WrrHOUT HISTORY 5-6, 12-13 (1982).
15 Id. at 5.
16 See J.M. ROBERTS, HISTORY OF THE WORLD 24-29 (1993); RICHARD WASwO, THE FOUNDING LEGEND
OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION: FROM VIRGIL TO VIETNAM 4-6 (1997).
17 See Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for Sustainability in Post-
Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All that Is Needed?, 18 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 197, 217-18
(2006); PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 51-53 (1992).
18 As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, "Our civilization is characterized by the word
'progress.' Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features." FITZPATRICK, supra
note 17, at 92 (quoting LUDWIG WInTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 7e (G.H. Von Wright & Heikki Nyman
eds., Peter Winch trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1980) (1977)). For an example of history told from this
perspective, see ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 3.
19 See ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 555. Roberts asserts:
By 1900 European civilization had shown itself to be the most successful which had ever existed.
Men might not always agree on what was most important about it but no one could deny that it
had produced wealth on an unprecedented scale and that it dominated the rest of the globe by
power and influence as no previous civilization had ever done. Europeans (or their descendants)
ran the world.
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individuals and peoples as a result of that difference on the universal scale of
Western development or, as often put, "human progress.,
20
Describing what he terms "the founding legend of Western civilization, 21
historian Richard Waswo summarizes the relationship between this
understanding of civilization and the international law that developed in the
European world:
When we Europeans felt we were barbarians, the Trojan legend told
us we weren't; now that we know that we were barbarians but aren't
any longer, we can drop the legend from our history, and use it
henceforth to determine the history of the barbarians we've so lately
discovered. The use of the legend .. .to determine the fate of the
indigenous populations in the new world is clearly visible in the
formation of a special branch of law. This would eventually become
international law, and was created expressly to deal with the
accelerating conflicts among the major powers of Europe, due in
large part to their competing claims over territory and trading
privileges in the new world, and with the vexed question of the
respective "rights" of the colonizers and the colonized.
As discussed briefly below, it is this belief in the superiority of Western
civilization and its universal applicability, considered so obvious as to be
"common sense" in the American worldview, which undergirds both our
current structures of international law and the United States' claims to be
upholding "universal" human values while exempting itself from
internationally accepted norms.
Winthrop's "city upon a hill" is repeatedly referenced by American leaders
not simply because it provides a powerful image, but because it captures the
Puritans' belief that their journey to the New World was a "reenactment of the
Exodus narrative revolv[ing] around a powerful theology of chosenness. 23
Central to their worldview was their faith in a divinely ordained "plan" for the
world and the notion that God had a particular "covenant" with humanity,
20 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 17, at 62-63 (describing the shift in intellectual activity from "drawing
things together" to discriminating between them, and noting the role this plays in establishing both identity and
order (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HuMAN SCIENCES 54
(1973))).
21 WASWO, supra note 16, at iii.
22 Id. at 136.
23 ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE EMPIRE OF RIGHT 6
(1995).
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24
which they were fulfilling. While the earliest English settlers claimed that
the indigenous peoples of the Americas would benefit by receiving both
Christianity and civilization, including "a well governed commonwealth" and
education in the "mechanical occupations, arts, and liberal sciences, 25 the
settlers' ideology focused on their opportunity to establish a New Israel, or
New Canaan, through which the world was to be regenerated and "God and
humankind ... reconciled at last.",26 Thus, the Puritans saw themselves to be
creating a new model of civilization for the European world, while also
bringing the purported benefits of Western civilization to indigenous peoples.
27
This "mission" was also invoked when, a century later, British colonists in
North America decided to declare their independence in the name of the
"unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. '28 The
leaders of the American rebellion were declaring the existence of an
unprecedented entity, a settler colonial state that intended to be recognized as
the first member of the hitherto exclusively European community of
"civilized" nations by virtue of representing a more evolved phase of Western
civilization. To justify this expansion of the prevailing Eurocentric paradigm,
and what to all appearances was a radical divergence from the law of nations
as it was then framed, American leaders called upon a "higher" natural law,
which recognized freedom, equality, and democracy as inherent rights. 29
There were, of course, many economic motivations behind the move to
independence,30 but the political theory of the emerging American republic
focused on the notion that the English system, which theoretically prevented
24 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 164-65 (1990).
25 Id. at 172 (quoting George Peckham, an early English promoter of American colonization).
26 STEPHANSON, supra note 23, at 7.
27 See NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE MAKING OF NEW
ENGLAND, 1500-1643, at 178 (1982). On the ideological transition made by the settlers from viewing
American Indians as objects of salvation to threats to civilization, see Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The
Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,430-31 (2006).
28 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
29 See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 242-43; Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 886-90 (1978).
30 Of particular concern were the Royal Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in WILCOMB E. WASHBURN,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES 2135-39 (1979), which prohibited settlement west of the
Allegheny and Appalachian Mountains without explicit permission from London, and the Stamp Act of 1765,
which was passed to fund implementation of the Royal Proclamation, see The Declarations of the Stamp Act
Congress (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT
CRISIS 1764-1766, at 62-63 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959); EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 53-70 (1953); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 228.
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despotism by dividing governmental powers between the King, the House of
Lords, and the House of Commons, had broken down.31  Furthermore, the
colonies were not represented in Parliament and thus were entirely dependent
32
on the King. Confronted with these failures of the English system but
wishing to claim its ideals, the founders of the new republic looked to the early
roots of their democracy, emphasizing that the Saxons had "introduced into
England an elective kingship, an annual assembly of tribal chiefs, the
witenagemot-the true forerunner of Parliament-trial by jury, and the
common law."33  As characterized by Thomas Jefferson and others, the
advances of Saxons had been undermined by the Norman Conquest and its
introduction of feudalism, then restored by the Magna Carta and, finally,
despite numerous popular struggles, lost again to more recent forms of
governmental corruption and oppression.34 The newly formed United States
was to revive the purer form of democratic governance attributed to the
settlers' Saxon ancestors.35
From the beginning, this "mission" affected the United States' relationship
to international law. In laying the foundation for their war of independence,
the American settlers were making the radical claim that they, rather than the
British Crown, possessed the legal right to colonize North America as they
deemed appropriate.36 In three centuries of European expansion, the legal
framing of colonialism had been considerably secularized, with sovereignty
coming to be vested in the various European crowns rather than the pope, but
in no case had the colonists themselves made the case that they independently
possessed the right to possession and dominion over "infidel" lands.37 On its
31 See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 62-63 (1970).
32 The undemocratic nature of this relationship and the colonists' resulting grievances are reflected in the
provisions of the Declaration of Independence, which reads as a bill of indictment against George III. While
issues of taxation, trade, immigration, and access to American Indian lands were clearly motivating the
signers, it is interesting to note how the bulk of their complaints are phrased in terms of the King's refusal to
comply with established processes of governance. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-30
(U.S. 1776).
33 PETERSON, supra note 31, at 57.
34 See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 267.
35 See id. (summarizing arguments made by Jefferson in a 1774 pamphlet entitled A Summary View of the
Rights of British America). The colonists also relied on indigenous models, but these were rarely
acknowledged. See generally DONALD A. GRINDE, JR., THE IROQUOIS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN
NATION (1977); DONALD A. GRINDE, JR. & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA
AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY (1991); BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTnEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS, AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1982).
36 See Grey, supra note 29, at 880-90.
37 See id. at 891. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 24.
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face, the American leaders were taking a position that violated international
law as it was recognized by the "civilized" world, for under that law, colonies
certainly had no right to rebel. As legal scholar Thomas Grey bluntly
concludes, "[t]he case for independence could not be made in legal terms. ' 38
To justify their actions, the Angloamerican rebels' Declaration of
Independence accused the King of having "plundered our seas, ravaged our
coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people," bringing in
mercenaries "to compleat the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already
begun with circumstances of Cruelty & Perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most
barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation., 39 As this
passage indicates, they were invoking the law of nations to lay the foundation
for their claim to independence. However, in asserting a legal right to rebel
under these conditions, the colonial leaders certainly were not prepared to
recognize a similar right of American Indians to self-determination. 40 Thus,
one of the points of contention raised by the Declaration was the colonists'
claim that the King's actions were leaving them unprotected against "the
merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. 41
The international law being invoked explicitly privileged the rights of
42colonizing powers over indigenous peoples. In essence, the "founding
fathers" were asserting their superior rights as colonizers, claiming to better
represent the civilization being brought to the New World and denouncing
Britain for treating them as colonial subjects rather than actors. American
leaders invoked a law that recognized freedom and equality as inherent rights,
but because the United States was created very literally by appropriating the
land and labor of others, they needed to rationalize the disparities between the
rights they claimed for themselves and those granted to their colonial subjects.
To do this, they emphasized the construct of civilization upon which Western
38 Grey, supra note 29, at 890.
39 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 26-27 (U.S. 1776).
40 The political ideology of both the American and French Revolutions emphasized a right to self-
determination. See B.C. NIRMAL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EVOLUTION,
UN LAW AND PRACTICE, NEW DIMENSIONS 27-28 (1999). However, the right of colonized peoples to self-
determination only began to be recognized in the aftermath of World War I, and then only in extremely limited
form and with respect to the colonies of defeated powers. See id. at 29, 31-36; ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 115-
95; HURST HANNMM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 27-49 (1990).
41 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776).
42 See ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 13-31; WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 59-225.
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law relied,43 depicting the indigenous peoples inhabiting the lands claimed by
European and Euroamerican colonizers as "heathen" and, increasingly,
"savage.,44  Not being civilized-i.e., not having conquered nature-these
Others had made no "progress" in the Western scheme of development and
therefore had no prior history worth acknowledging. 45 Once colonized peoples
were defined as less than fully human, it was a short leap to justifying the
appropriation of their "unsettled" lands for "productive" use and either
eliminating the inhabitants or using them, much as domesticated animals,
46
simply for their labor power.
This paradigm also provided the underlying rationale for the construct of an
American "manifest destiny" to expand across the continent and to acquire
overseas territories. Between 1803 and 1853, as a result of the Louisiana
Purchase, the acquisition of Florida, the annexation of about half of Mexico,
and the occupation of the Oregon territory, the United States extended its
territorial claims to encompass all of what is now known as its lower forty-
eight states.47 In 1867, it also claimed Alaska by virtue of its "purchase" from
Russia.48 There was, of course, continued resistance from indigenous peoples
in these territories, but in 1890, following the Wounded Knee massacre, the
United States declared the "internal frontier" to be closed.49
Summarizing this expansionist ideology, attorney and author John
O'Sullivan coined the phrase "manifest destiny," opining in 1845 that
America's claim "is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to
possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the
43 See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 80-82 (Fulcrum Publishing 2d ed.
1994) (1973); FITZPATRICK, supra note 17, at 41-42, 72, 92-95; WAswO, supra note 16, at 6.
44 See FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF
CONQUEST 43, 76-78 (W.W. Norton 1976) (1975) (describing the transition in the early 1600s from an
emphasis on indigenous peoples as "wild," but still people, to "savages" akin to beasts). For background, see
generally RONALD SANDERS, LOST TRIBES AND PROMISED LANDS: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACISM (1978).
In the U.S. context, see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 24; CHARLES M. SEGAL & DAVID C. STINEBACK,
PURITANS, INDIANS, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (1977).
45 See generally WOLF, supra note 14.
46 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 171, 227-86.
47 For further discussion of this history, see Natsu Taylor Saito, Colonial Presumptions: The War on
Terror and the Roots of American Exceptionalism, 1 GEO. J. MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 67 (2008).
48 FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A REINTERPRETATION
229 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (1963).
49 See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 290 (rev. and
updated ed. 1995). On the massacre at Wounded Knee, see RALPH K. ANDRIST, THE LONG DEATH: THE LAST
DAYS OF THE PLAINS INDIAN 350-52 (1964); DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 401-02 (1970).
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development of the great experiment of liberty and federative self government
entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to the space of air and earth
suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of growth ....
The term "manifest destiny" quickly assumed widespread popularity in
mainstream discourse, for it evoked the earliest English settlers' vision of a
New Canaan and captured the essence of the United States' claim to the
legitimacy not only of its independent existence, but also its constant
expansion.51  The expropriation of native lands and the concomitant
decimation of indigenous peoples within the claimed territory of the United
States provided the material base for the extension of U.S. hegemony over
other peoples, and the rationale used to accomplish this consolidation "at
home" has been extended subsequently to justify the global reach of U.S.
power.52 This rendering of the American "creation story," with its framing of
origins and purpose, has remained remarkably consistent over time,
rationalizing the superimposition of the U.S. model onto international
economic, political, and legal systems as well as individual states across the
planet while simultaneously being used by American leaders to exempt
themselves from participation in many of the institutions it has founded or
exerted considerable influence over.
Thus, to give a few examples, in 1823, the United States announced what
has come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, a policy
described by Hans Morgenthau as a form of "localized imperialism," under
which the United States essentially precluded any further European
colonization in Latin America.53 Through the Roosevelt Corollary, announced
in 1904, it further claimed for itself the right to intervene in Latin America.
54
50 MERK, supra note 48, at 31-32 (quoting John O'Sullivan, Editorial, The True Title, N.Y. MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 27, 1845).
51 O'Sullivan had previously used the phrase in criticizing what he termed interference in U.S. expansion
into Texas and Mexico, but it became popularized after he published the New York Morning News article
quoted above, in which he was referring to U.S. plans to acquire Oregon. See id. at 24-32. The week after
publication of O'Sullivan's piece, Massachusetts Representative Robert C. Winthrop referred to the phrase in
Congress, and it was soon widely referenced in popular discourse. REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND
MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 220 (1981).
52 See Saito, supra note 47, at 99-109.
53 See DANIEL C. GILMAN, JAMES MONROE 161-62 (1883) (quoting James Monroe, Seventh Annual
Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823). On Morgenthau's characterization, see Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian
Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1683, 1694 n.31 (2000) (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU
& KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 70 (6th ed. 1985)).
54 See Louis A. P6rez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt
and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 699, 709 (2007).
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Following World War I, the Wilson administration went to extraordinary
lengths to shape the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and establish the League
of Nations, but the Senate's failure to ratify that treaty precluded American
participation in the League or the Permanent Court of International Justice.
55
As World War II drew to a close, the United States played a key role in
establishing the United Nations and in ensuring that it was structured in a
manner that would preserve American influence. 56  In 1950, a highly
influential report to the National Security Council commonly known as NSC-
68 stated that the United States' goal was to "foster a world environment in
which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the
concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in
the world community." 57 The report continued, noting that it was this purpose
that "gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations." 58  Since
that time, however, the United States has developed a reputation, even among
its allies, for acting unilaterally and often hypocritically with respect to
international law-a reality it was forced to confront rather abruptly in 2001
when it lost its seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commission for the first time
since 1947.
59
Even as American leaders continue to emphasize the importance of
bringing democracy and the rule of law to all peoples, since the formation of
the United Nations, they have exempted the United States quite regularly from
the international legal regimes they played an instrumental role in creating.
60
55 See PAGE SMITH, AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND
WORLD WAR I 720-38 (1985); FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE LEGALIST
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1898-1922) 138-39 (1999).
56 See generally STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOuNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(2003). On the United States' continued disproportionate influence over U.N. affairs, see PHYLLIS BENNIS,
CALLING THE SHOTS: HOW WASHINGTON DOMINATES TODAY'S UN (1996).
57 National Security Council, NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive
Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security § VI.A (Apr. 14, 1950), reprinted in
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICY 234-93 (1974).
5' Id. at 253.
59 See Connie de la Vega, Human Rights and Trade: Inconsistent Application of Treaty Law in the
United States, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 4, 36 (2004) (noting that in 2001, U.S. observer status at
the Council of Europe was disputed because the U.S. continues to use the death penalty, and that the U.S. was
excluded from the Inter-American Commission of the Organization of American States in 2003 because of a
variety of human rights concerns).
60 Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 307, 309-13 (2007); Justice Richard J. Goldstone, The Consequences of the United States Abdicating Its
Moral and Political Leadership of the Free World, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587, 593-99 (2007); Louis
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Thus, for example, U.S. officials have repudiated the International Criminal
Court;61 announced a new doctrine of "preemptive" war, which to all
appearances violates the U.N. Charter;62 and maintained that the Geneva
Conventions are "obsolete" and can be considered optional.63  They have
"disappeared" and arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and
foreign nationals alike in violation of their obligations under both treaties and
customary international law64 and subjected prisoners to practices condemned
internationally and domestically as torture. 65  In light of the dominant role
played by the United States in establishing the financial, political, and military
structures through which global power is now exercised and international law
defined, the question becomes why it would put such effort into creating a
legal regime only to reject it in so many respects.
Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
341-45 (1995); van der Vyver, supra note 5, at 776-77, 789-95.
61 Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, the United States and the International
Criminal Court, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006); Johan D. van der Vyver, Book Review, 18
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133, 142 (2004) (reviewing BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003)); John R. Worth,
Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "Un-Signing" of the Rome
Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J. 245, 245-47 (2004).
62 See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, THE MYTH OF
PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 3 (Aug. 2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
63 Id. In 2002, White House Counsel and future Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent a memorandum
to President George W. Bush, which argued that the "new paradigm" of law occasioned by the war on
terrorism "renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint
some of its provisions." Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George W. Bush,
President, U.S., 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/
cheney/gonzales addington memo-jan252001.pdf; see Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1017, 1022-23 (2007).
64 Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment,
Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 384,
414 (2007); NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION To GUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND
THE PREROGATIVE STATE 153-69 (2007). See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
65 On the practices engaged in by the United States at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, see generally
SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAm (2004). On the treatment
of prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay, see generally MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE
WORLD SHOULD KNOW (2004). For a summary of the United States' 2006 report to the supervisory body of
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and that body's findings that the indefinite detentions of persons at
Guantdnamo and those extrajudicially rendered to third countries constitute a violation of the CAT, see Note,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 703-05
(2006). On the findings of the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission, see generally
Brian D. Tittemore, Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
378 (2006).
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Since 2001, American leaders have often cited the exigencies of a newly
identified threat of global terrorism to explain away their deviations from
international law, invoking the familiar argument that extant rules are
inadequate to preserve the United States and, more generally, Western
civilization from the ravages of barbarism.66 However, such recent displays of
disregard for international law are quite consistent with U.S. practice through
much of the twentieth century, when terrorism was not considered a major
threat.67 If, as many have observed, the United States' "do as I say, not as I
do" approach to international law is a significant stumbling block to advancing
the human rights consensus, the underlying premises of American
exceptionalism, not just contemporary U.S. practices, will have to be
addressed. The position now being asserted is not fundamentally different
from that claimed by the founders when they utilized the colonial law of their
era to justify their occupation of North America and simultaneously asserted a
prerogative to deviate from its strictures for the greater good of bringing
Western civilization to a more advanced stage.
The fundamental premise of American exceptionalism-that it is
acceptable and sometimes necessary to violate international law for a "greater
good" best determined by American leaders-cannot be successfully countered
by the argument that the United States is violating international law.68 That
fact has already been accounted for, explicitly or implicitly. Challenges to the
exceptionalist stance can only succeed if they engage the underlying
worldview, which posits Western civilization as the highest stage of a process
of unilinear and inevitable human development, and the American state as its
most advanced iteration.69  Otherwise, one is reduced to accepting the
underlying premise and arguing that the "greater good" at issue is not
sufficiently "good" to justify this or that particular deviation from the rule of
law.
Further, this exceptionalist rationale cannot be countered simply by
advocating for U.S. compliance with international law because it is a legal
66 For example, President Bush informed Congress that the war on terror "is civilization's fight."
Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress, Sept. 23, 2001, in GEORGE W. BUSH, WE WILL PREVAIL:
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ON WAR, TERRORISM, AND FREEDOM 11, 14-15 (2003). On the "uncivilized"
nature of the enemy, see Jeanne M. Woods & James M. Donovan, "Anticipatory Self-Defense" and Other
Stories, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 494-95 (2005).
67 For an overview of these practices, see generally Saito, supra note 47, at 105-09.
68 Rosemary Foot, Exceptionalism Again: The Bush Administration, the "Global War on Terror" and
Human Rights, 26 LAw & HIST. REV. 707, 708 (2008).
69 See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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system that still embodies many of the presumptions of the European societies
from which it emerged. Such presumptions include the belief in one universal
path of human progress, generally measured by the degree to which societies
have incorporated scientific and technological "advances," and a belief in the
"values" embodied in Western understandings of the constructs of freedom,
democracy and individual rights 0.7 As legal scholar David Kennedy
summarizes:
International law has seen itself as the voice of civilization, of the
center, of the modern, of the future, and of universal humanism and
progress against, or in dialog with, the voices of the non-Christian
world, the primitive, underdeveloped, non-Western, outlaw world of
those who do not yet see things from a high place.
71
For those of us steeped in this concept of civilization and the understanding of
human nature from which it derives, questioning these fundamental beliefs is
very difficult. More to the point, it is difficult for us to envision an
international legal system which is not rooted in this worldview. However, the
movements which have resisted universal applicability of individuated human
rights can give us some insight into directions which could be taken by the
world order of coming generations.
II. THE DECOLONIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
If we hope to see the emergence of a truly "universal" human rights
paradigm applicable to and accepted by all peoples, we may have to be willing
to step back from the presumption that a one-size-fits-all Truth can be
rationally discerned and structured into the law. Given the extent to which
contemporary structures of international law are so deeply rooted in the core
narrative of Western civilization, and its history so intertwined with that of
European colonialism, meaningful reconsideration of the framework of
international human rights law-a project sometimes referred to as its
72decolonization-would appear to be necessary. This is a project far beyond
70 See generally ANGHIE, supra note 8; FITZPATRICK, supra note 17.
71 David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335,
359 (2000).
72 On the decolonization of international law, see, for example, James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism,
Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1013 (2007); Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality of
International Law, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459 (2005); Darren C. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics,
Human Rights, and the United Nations, 19 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 95, 122 (2006).
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the scope of this Essay, but a brief consideration of its potential may render it a
bit less overwhelming.
Some observations by law professor B. S. Chimni on the work of
international lawyers and scholars in India during their first "post-colonial"
decades provide one useful starting point. According to Chimni, Indian
scholars "indicted colonial international law for legitimizing the subjugation
and oppression of Asian peoples ... [and] emphasized that Asian states were
not strangers to the idea of international law" nor culturally incapable of full
participation in the international legal system, and developed a strategy of
global coalition-building to bring about change within, and expansion of, that
system.73 The benefits of this approach, he observes, included the recording of
contributions made by those deemed Other to the evolution of law, the realism
it brought to attempts to change legal structures, and the emphasis it placed on
the inclusion of the world's vast majority of Third World peoples into
contemporary law.74 As we entered an era of formal decolonization in the
1960s and 70s, these were similarly important to the incorporation of newly
decolonized peoples into the international legal system.
Chimni notes, however, that three basic weaknesses undermined this
approach. One was that "the end of colonialism was equated with the end of
international relations based on exploitation and violence," with a resulting
failure "to see that the structures that had spawned colonialism remained in
place., 75 A second was that the adoption of positivist methodology prevented
international legal scholars from addressing "the world beyond rules,"
precluding analyses of how institutions function within historical and political
contexts.76 Finally, Chimni observes "that the first generation of international
law scholarship represented the post colonial State as standing above conflicts
and classes and the role of the intellectuals was viewed as supporting this State
in its nation building tasks. 77 This, he concludes, resulted in a blindness to the
violence of the state, an initial neglect of human rights law, an acceptance of
law-making as the prerogative of government bureaucrats, and, most
importantly, the exclusion of "consideration of the impact of the international
legal structures on the lives of ordinary men and women" and, therefore, of
73 B. S. Chimni, Teaching, Research and Promotion of International Law in India: Past, Present and
Future, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 368, 369-70 (2001).
74 Id. at 370.
75 id.
76 Id. at 371.
77 Id. at 372.
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their resistance to the policies and practices of these structures. 78 Put most
simply, the attempt to adopt legal structures that were divorced from the
people's stories proved inadequate to meet their real needs.
Extrapolating from this case study, we can see the critical importance of
beginning from the premise that all peoples-not simply the states that purport
to represent them-are the rightful subjects of international law. In turn, this
requires recognition of a deep and rich human history in which societies of all
different types have developed systems governing their relations with others,
and acknowledgement that historical context and political effects cannot be
detached from legal norms or institutions and that blindly adopting either the
methodological approach or the structures of the currently hegemonic model
will predictably reproduce the relationships upon which it was founded and
which it went to such pains to maintain. If we take the all peoples premise of
the UDHR and other human rights treaties seriously, we must likewise take it
in historical context, understanding that it refers not simply to the aggregate of
individual atomized "units" within the global world order, but to peoples, each
with their own multilayered identities, cultures, histories, and world views.79
With this very simple conceptual shift, the claim to universality, so central
not only to the ideology of Western civilization but also to the contemporary
international legal system, begins to crumble. Author Gustavo Esteva and
Professor Madhu Suri Prakash observe, "[O]ur grassroots experiences continue
to teach us that we do not live in a universe, but in a pluriverse; that the
universality in the human condition claimed by human rights propagators
exists only in their minority worldview."80  Given the multiplicity of
perspectives readily evident to anyone willing to see them, the assertion of a
universal Truth (or, more fundamentally, that there is one universal Truth),
requires a concomitant deprecation of the alternatives. In many ways, this
observation summarizes the dilemma of "universalizing" human rights.
The legitimacy of the paradigm of Western civilization rests on its claims
to be bringing the twin virtues of material well-being ("development") and the
protection of human dignity ("universal rights") to all of humanity.81
Resistance to the imposition of Western "values" is portrayed as an attempt to
revert to a pre-Enlightenment "stage" of civilization, in which societies are
78 id.
79 See ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 8, at 11-14.
" Id. at 125.
81 See ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 204, 254-58.
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ruled by dictators of one sort or another, unconstrained by the need to respect
individual rights. 82 In order for Western civilization to represent the apex of
human history, rather than simply one of many possible forms of social
organization, it had to define itself in opposition to the Other, for without that
Other it could not validate its claims to supremacy.8 3 Although the rights of
peoples to maintain their culture and identity have been recognized over the
past few decades,8 4 the movement to expand the catalogue of universally
agreed-upon rights also has gained momentum, leading to debates about the
legality and acceptability of particular social practices or legal sanctions.
8 5
The emphasis of the current human rights paradigm, like that of development,
on raising all peoples to a "higher" level of civilization, rather than on erasing
the distinction between the "civilized" and the "uncivilized"-or the
"developed" and the "un(der)developed" 86 -is part of what allows it to be
challenged as simply another attempt by the Western powers to remake all
other cultures in their own image.
87
One expects that there are truly universal values common to all peoples, but
finding them by exploring the multiverse of actual worldviews and their
attendant values and imposing them by decree are two very different things. If
international law is to be decolonized from the perspective of those who have
been colonized rather than that of their colonizers, human rights law, too, will
have to be broadened to recognize the diversity of human perspectives. In
attempting to expand the human rights framework in a manner open to
alternative understandings of human freedom and representative forms of
governance, a good starting point might be the recognition that in many
cultures people are seen as having responsibilities rather than rights-
responsibilities to each other, to coming generations, and to the earth itself.
82 Antony Anghie observes that "[t]he vocabulary of international human rights law, democracy and the
rule of law-and, indeed, market oriented economies-have now become the markers of a 'civil state."' Id. at
296.
83 See id. at 52-65; FITZPATRICK, supra note 17, at 38; WAswo, supra note 16, at 6.
84 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc.
No. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007).
85 See, e.g., Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, 94 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95 (2000); Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996); Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human Rights:
American Relativism, 4 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 43 (1998).
86 On the terminological shift from civilization to development, see ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 196-211.
See generally Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 2 (2004).
87 See ESTEVA& PRAKASH, supra note 8, at 117, 204-11.
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From such perspectives, justice may be perceived as the antithesis of what
we in the West associate with law. Thus, for example, Esteva and Prakash
report that within the "pluriverse" of the many Indian peoples of the Mexican
province of Oaxaca, indigenous traditions of justice have prevailed, even as
they have adapted to five centuries of invasions.88 They quote one indigenous
Oaxacan who observed that "Westerners . . . represent justice with a
blindfolded woman. We want her with her eyes well open, to fully appreciate
what is happening. Instead of neutrality or impartiality, we want compassion.
The person committing a crime needs to be understood, rather than submitted
to a trial., 89 Similarly, a municipal president in Oaxaca lamented, "I can no
longer do what is fair. Every time I try to bring justice to our community,
applying our traditional practices to amend wrongdoings, a human rights
activist comes to stop me."90 As these stories illustrate, legal systems may
have to reconsider the premise that an abstracted, rational, and universally
applicable rule of law best embodies justice.
It is, by definition, impossible to summarize a pluriverse of understandings
of what truly constitutes justice and how "rights" are conceived by different
peoples. It may, however, be useful to consider just a few perspectives on the
construct of "freedom," often proffered as a universal value. The relevant
question here is not whether all peoples wish to be free, but how and by whom
the meaning of freedom is determined. A year after the United States invaded
Afghanistan, Sonali Kolhatkar, vice president of the Afghan Women's
Mission, contrasted George W. Bush's self-congratulatory statements about
having freed Afghan mothers and daughters from the veil with the harsh
realities of their daily lives: "What good is an uncovered face if it is starving to
death?" 91 Noting that their most significant problems were starvation, lack of
shelter and health care, civil disorder, and so-called ethnic cleansing, Kolhatkar
emphasized that what women in Afghanistan needed was not to be freed from
the burqa, but "for the U.S. to stop imposing freedom through bombs, stop
backing human rights violators and warlords, and stop hindering the security
forces from expanding to the rest of the country."
92
88 Id. atl 1.
89 Id. (quoting Marcos Sandoval of the Triqui people of Oaxaca).
90 Id. (quoting R6mulo, municipal president in Huayapam, Oaxaca, in a conversation with the authors).
91 Sonali Kolhatkar, Afghan Women: Enduring American "Freedom," Z MAG., Dec. 2002, at 7, 7.
92 Id. On the scope of and damage caused by U.S. bombing in Afghanistan, see John Quigley, The
Afghanistan War and Self-Defense, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 541, 550-53 (2002). Senate hearings revealed that in
2006, "we saw a resurgent Taliban, growing violence-including an alarming rise in the types of suicide
bombings and IED attacks so common in Iraq-and a ballooning opium trade." Press Release, Senator Robert
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Under these circumstances, one must ask what "freedom" means and,
again, who gets to decide. For many Iraqis the consequences of "Operation
Iraqi Freedom," as the United States' 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation
was called, have been grim. A study by Iraqi physicians working with
epidemiologists at Johns Hopkins University, published by the British medical
journal Lancet in October 2006, estimated that 655,000 more people had died
in Iraq since the invasion than would have died had the invasion not
occurred, 93 and many sources reported that the civilian death toll had likely
exceeded one million by early 2008.94 According to Human Rights Watch and
other organizations, U.S. forces in Iraq failed to curb massive looting of
governmental facilities in the aftermath of the invasion, did not guard military
arsenals, and disbanded security forces, creating a climate in which thefts,
carjackings, kidnappings, and sexual assaults could be committed with
impunity. 95  A common complaint was that neither Iraqi civilians nor U.S.
soldiers were clearly informed of the rules of engagement, with the result that
civilians have been disappeared, detained, and killed, and many homes have
been demolished by tank and artillery fire.
96
Some Iraqis, like Fatima al-Naddaf, a spokesperson for a women's
advocacy organization in Baghdad, consider themselves anything but liberated:
"Before, Iraq was under sanctions, but at least it was a free country, not
occupied., 97  According to al-Naddaf, the mass detention of Iraqi men has
jeopardized not only their safety but that of women and children, and the
incarceration of women has been underreported as well.98 Similarly, 63-year-
P. Casey, Jr., Casey on Afghanistan Hearing (Mar. 8, 2007), http://casey.senate.gov/newsrooni/press/release/
?id=75f7a67b-229d-4814-ab5a-lb32cc768529.
9' Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-sectional Cluster Sample
Survey, 368 LANCET 1421, 1426 (2006). Of these deaths, 601,000 were attributable to violence. Id.
94 See, e.g., Tina Susman, Civilian Deaths May Top 1 Million, Poll Data Indicate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2007, at A6; Civilian Death Toll in Iraq May Have Surpassed 1 Million, DAILY STAR (Lebanon), Mar. 25,
2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition-id=10&categ-id=2&article-id=90190. Other sources
put the total closer to 100,000. See, e.g., Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ (last visited June
18, 2009).
95 Joe Stork & Fred Abrahams, Sidelined: Human Rights in Postwar Iraq, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT 93, 96 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/wr2k4/download/6.pdf.
96 See id. See generally ALl A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE
PEACE (2007).
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old Asmaa Ali observes, "[N]ow I feel Iraq has become like a big prison." 99
Such stories illustrate not simply that the U.S. version of freedom being
brought to Iraq represents occupation and imprisonment for many Iraqis, but
that true self-determination cannot be achieved simply by the imposition,
welcomed or not, of independent statehood, but must encompass the ability of
all peoples to determine the meaning of freedom for themselves.
Decolonizing international law will likely require us to question both the
state-centered framework of contemporary legal institutions and the
presumption that rights are possessed solely by individuals. According to
Robert Vachon, among many indigenous traditional cultures, "it is difficult to
understand that rights or entitlements could be homocentrically defined by a
human being. That they, furthermore, could be defined by a sovereign
state... is almost ridiculous." 1°° Thus, from some perspectives, freedom is
not a collection of individual rights to be guaranteed by law, but the ability to
act in accordance with one's responsibilities to future generations and the earth
itself. "Progress"-at least when defined as movement up a hierarchy of
civilization-may be inversely correlated with the ability to be truly self-
determining and, therefore, with freedom.10 1 Articulating alternate visions of
human rights and freedoms in any comprehensive or universalizing way, and
disentangling them from the many layers of presumptions about history and
progress that undergird the master narrative through which contemporary
international law defines itself, is an enormous task. More significantly, it
99 Id. The United States' claim to be protecting civilization was similarly undermined when U.S. troops
allowed the Iraq Museum to be looted of approximately 15,000 historical artifacts, widely viewed as "some of
the greatest treasures from ancient Mesopotamia, the birthplace of civilization." Kirsten E. Petersen, Note,
Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the Iraq Museum and a New Proposal for the Wartime Protection of
Museums, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 163, 164 (2007). On the United States' failure to intervene, see Juliana V.
Campagna, War or Peace: It Is Time for the United States to Ratify the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 271, 274-82 (2005).
100 ESTEvA & PRAKASH, supra note 8, at 110 (quoting Robert Vachon, L'dtude du Pluralisme Juridique:
Une Approche Diatopique et Dialogale, 29 J. LEG. PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 163, 165 (1990)).
101 As native Hawaiian scholar Haunani-Kay Trask says, "[b]urdened by a linear, progressive conception
of history and by an assumption that Euro-American culture flourishes at the upper end of that progression,
Westerners have told the history of Hawai'i as an inevitable if occasionally bittersweet triumph of Western
ways over 'primitive' Hawaiian ways." HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM
AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAwAI 115 (Univ. of Hawaii Press 1999) (1993). For a classically Eurocentric
analysis positing this trajectory in terms of economic development, see generally W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (2d ed. 1971). Marxist analyses have been criticized
as similarly constraining. See, e.g., Frank Black Elk, Observations on Marxism and Lakota Tradition, in
MARXISM AND NATIVE AMERICANS 137, 141 (Ward Churchill ed., 1983) ("[I]t seems Marxists are hung up on
exactly the same ideas of 'progress' and 'development' that are the guiding motives of those they seek to
overthrow.").
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cannot be done from "above," for people must be free to tell their own stories
on their own terms-a process diametrically opposed to having those stories
rendered into quaint, anthropologically "discovered" pieces of a story which
collapses all histories into the narrative of Western civilization.
102
Breaking out of the unidimensional and highly constricted understanding of
rights and freedoms as they have been defined by the purveyors of Western
civilization will require nuanced discussions that distinguish between the
renunciation of the vision of a grand Eurocentric march through history and the
notion that one state of affairs cannot be characterized as more desirable than
another. Literary critic Terry Eagleton warns:
It is a mistake to believe that all grand narratives are
progressive.... But to argue against History as progressive is not, of
course, to claim that there is never any progress at all.., anyone who
did would be making quite as meta-narrational a claim as someone
who thought that history has been steadily on the up since the sack of
Rome. But this is different from believing that, say, there is a
universal pattern to history characterized by an inexorable growth of
productive forces. 
103
Similarly, with respect to the protection of human rights, we will have to
distinguish arguments against the imposition of one universal set of "rights"
from the advocacy of simplistic cultural or moral relativism. As Esteva and
Prakash emphasize,
[t]hose who have the courage to depart from the Grand March of
Human Rights have countless other cultural paths open to them.
These cultural alternatives do not entail alliances with the Pinochets,
the Pol Pots, the oppressors of Tibet, the Burmese military
dictatorship, the ISropagators of Hindu dowry deaths or Islamic
fundamentalism.
Pluralism, which acknowledges the significance of deeply held values within
particular perspectives or cultures, is in many respects diametrically opposed to
relativism, which imposes-universally-a lack of collective values, replacing
them with a universe of atomistic individual beliefs.
10 5
102 On the positive potential of "storytelling" in legal settings, see generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED (1987); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
103 TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM 55 (1996).
104 ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 8, at 126.
105 See id. at 130.
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One can acknowledge the importance of the rule of law, including the
rights it purports to guarantee, to the extent one acknowledges the realities of
contemporary state power, without conceding that the extant balance of
political or economic power, or the hegemonic history it would impose upon
us, comprises all of our reality. 106 One need not limit freedom to a right, or set
of rights, guaranteed by a system of law "emanat[ing] from the legislative
organ of the state, which has the monopoly of legitimate violence to enforce
it.''1 7 Instead, freedom can be defined to reflect the understandings of the
peoples in the many traditions that have been appropriated by, and often
assimilated into, the structures imposed through colonial domination.
Speaking with respect to the deconstruction of development theory, Gilbert
Rist says,
[T]o dwell so much on the Western specificity of the 'development'
belief would have been rather futile if one were then to claim that
one's own conclusions were universal. Respect for cultural diversity,
then, prohibits generalizations. There are numerous ways of living a
'good life', and it is up to each society to invent its own. But this in
no way justifies the injustices of the present day, when some
continue to 'develop' while others have to make do with a 'happy
poverty'-on the false grounds that this corresponds to their
particular culture.
108
Similarly, with respect to international law, it seems clear that we must be
receptive to the vast pluriverse of alternative worldviews without falling into a
simplistic relativism which precludes addressing very concrete injustices.
III. CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE PATHS
If we want to truly advance the consensus about international human rights
in a manner that takes into account the stories, or realities, of all peoples, how
would we begin this process? In an analysis that can be usefully adapted to
this discussion, Rist proposes three "paths" with the potential to address
problems resulting from the presumption that human history is inevitably the
106 According to Esteva and Prakash, "Gandhi's politics of liberation epitomized this kind of struggle:
appealing to the highest moral ideals of the colonizers, while not renouncing his own culture's moral ideals,
defining human well-being or 'the good life."' Id. at 135.
107 Id. at 131.
108 GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH 241 (2d
ed. 2002).
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story of development and growth.109  The first involves acknowledging
contemporary realities without necessarily accepting the ideological
justifications-or stories-most commonly accompanying them, i.e.,
"manag[ing] without illusions a system that is known to be perverse."110 If we
were to approach the extant system of international human rights law by
acknowledging its inherent, historically rooted inequities and "manage" them
with an eye to realizing its stated goals of international peace and security,
including a genuine right to self-determination, perhaps we would be able to
open up space in which the purposes and effects of this body of law and policy
could be more honestly addressed and decisions about the allocation of the
international resources imbued with a higher degree of transparency and
accountability."'
A second path, described by Rist as "a wager on the positive aspects of
exclusion,"'1 2 involves reinforcing alternatives developed by "social
movements in the South which have stopped expecting everything to come
from the good will of those in power, and no longer believe either in aid or in
international co-operation."'1 3 This might involve removing the constraints
that prevent communities and grassroots organizations from developing their
own systems of self-reliance and reviving their own systems of value. 1 14 It
might also mean rolling back the efforts of states and of international
institutions to uniformly regulate all aspects of human behavior and social
interaction,11 5 again providing space for rediscovering and re-establishing legal
processes whose effectiveness would be measured by the degree to which they
result in "justice" as understood by the community at issue. Again, this does
not require a retreat into relativism or localized majority rule; each community
would still function in relationship to state and international structures and a
balance would have to be worked out as to the role of these larger institutions.
However, that could be done, as it were, from the bottom up, with the well-
being of all affected peoples being the measure, thus reversing the current
trend of ever-increasing micro-management of social relations determined by
an abstracted power and enforced by its monopoly on armed force.
109 Id. at 242.
110 Id. at 248; see id. at 242.
... See id. at 248.
112 Id. at 248.
113 Id. at 243.
114 See id. at 243-44.
115 See id. at 243-48.
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Additionally, legal theory must be addressed, something Rist characterizes
as developing "strategies of transgression" designed to "extricate thought from
the circle of belief."'1 16  This involves stepping back from our beliefs,
challenging the ideas considered self-evident in ordinary discourse, and
constructing non-hegemonic explanatory models which recognize a wide range
of historic and cultural realities. 117 Attempts to unleash the liberatory potential
of alternative systems of world order need not necessarily mean the wholesale
destruction of current mechanisms for international consultation and
cooperation, but these institutions and procedures must certainly be opened to
the wide range of perspectives and histories embodied in the stories of the
peoples of the world.
Lumbee legal scholar Robert Williams provides one example of the
positive effects of opening an international body, the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples, to the pluriverse of human stories. 118 Williams explains
that the Working Group set aside the usual "screening function[s]" employed
in such venues-usually questions of what is to be considered valid evidence
and who has standing to present it-to allow for broader participation.1 19 After
summarizing just a few of the stories he heard over the course of a decade, 120
Williams concludes that even within the limits of U.N. procedures and the
statist structures of contemporary international law, this process had a visible
impact on the legal institutions through which colonialism continues to
function:
Such stories told by indigenous peoples . . . have raised
consciousness in international human rights forums about the
continuing genocidal threat of the European doctrine of
discovery.... And through the power of their stories, indigenous
peoples have begun to transform legal thought and doctrine about the
rights that matter to them under international law.
12 1
Without the opportunity to incorporate these narratives, it is unlikely that the
U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples122
116 Id. at 248; see id. at 245-48.
117 Id. at 247.
118 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining
the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660 (1990).
119 Id. at678-81.
120 Id. at 680-81.
121 Id. at 682.
122 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A1RES1611295 (Sept. 7, 2007).
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would have been passed in September 2007, after a quarter-century of
resistance from the major settler colonial states, most notably the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
123
Despite its many limitations, the Declaration does recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples to: determine their own identities; 124 maintain and preserve
their own histories, cultures, religions, and systems of health and education;
125
determine their own political status and, in limited fashion, exercise political
autonomy; 126 be protected upon their own lands and in controlling their natural
resources; 127 have their treaties recognized and enforced; 128 and have such
redress as is possible for lands and resources taken from them without their
free and informed consent. 129 If this much can be accomplished within a legal
system that, quite literally, was created out of, and for the purpose of,
exploiting indigenous peoples, the possibilities for a truly different world order
that does not presume the sanctity of Western civilization are surely worth
considering.
In laying the groundwork for a re-envisioned and reconstructed system of
human rights law capable of protecting the well-being of all peoples, our
"strategies of transgression" must, of course, take into account the ideological
and material realities of our time. Given the extraordinary military, economic,
and political power currently wielded by the United States, it is unlikely that
substantive change can occur on a global scale without addressing the U.S.
approach to international law and institutions and, in turn, confronting
American exceptionalism. International law as currently recognized evolved
quite recently from a system that was self-consciously designed to
accommodate relations between and among the "civilized" states of Europe
and later extended to encompass states subsequently recognized by the original
members of this "community" as sufficiently assimilated into this system.
130
While contemporary geopolitical realities must be acknowledged, of
course, it is also becoming evident that the political, economic, and military
123 For background information, see International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp (last visited June 18, 2009).
124 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 122, art. 8(2)(a)
125 Id. arts. 13(1), 15(l), 21(1).
126 Id. arts. 3-4.
127 Id. art. 8(2)(b).
128 Id. art. 37(1).
129 Id. art. 10.
130 See ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 144-46, 199-207.
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structures created by these states has brought us a world order which is neither
just nor sustainable. 1 31 Simply insisting that the United States play by the rules
of this international order will not resolve the most fundamental problems that
have been generated by that order.132 As we are gradually forced to confront
the reality that civilization may be rapidly rendering the planet
uninhabitable, 133 we might do well to rethink the fundamental premises of the
deeply embedded notions of manifest destiny and human progress and to begin
reconstructing our understanding of human rights by drawing on the depth of
understanding and experience found in the "pluriverse" of human societies. In
turn, this will require reconceptualizing the stories of civilization and of
American exceptionalism so deeply embedded in Western worldviews, and
incorporating the narratives of those who have been historically excluded, not
simply because of their intrinsic value but because they will allow us to see the
inadequacies of contemporary international legal norms and structures. To
paraphrase Ben Okri, perhaps if we change the stories on which our legal order
is built, we will be able to expand that order to reflect the rights-and
responsibilities-of all peoples.
134
131 For alarming summaries of statistical indicators, see Extinction Rate Across the Globe Reaches
Historical Proportions, Sc. DAILY, Jan. 10, 2002, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/01/
020109074801.htm (noting an estimate that half of all living bird and mammal species will be extinct within
the next two or three centuries); UNDP, supra note 4, at 257-60 tbl.9; UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRisis 2 (2006), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf; WORLD BANK, 05 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
(2005), available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Cover.htm.
132 See, e.g., AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 2.
133 Much has been written about this devastation, although generally from a perspective that assumes it is
a problem for "civilization" to solve. See, e.g., Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The
Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development
Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 178-96 (1996);
AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
134 See OKRI, supra note 1, at 46.
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